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Abstract
Although the notion of grounding in dia-
logue is widely acknowledged, the exact
nature of the representations of common
ground and its specific role in language pro-
cessing are topics of ongoing debate. Pro-
posals range from rich, explicit represent-
ations of common ground in the minds of
speakers (Clark, 1996) to implicit repres-
entations, or even none at all (Pickering
and Garrod, 2004). We argue that a min-
imal model of mentalising that tracks the
interlocutor’s state in terms of general states
of perception, understanding, acceptance
and agreement, and is continuously updated
based on communicative listener feedback,
is a viable and practical concept for the
purpose of building conversational agents.
We present such a model based on a dy-
namic Bayesian network that takes listener
feedback and dialogue context into account,
and whose temporal dynamics are modelled
with respect to discourse structure. The po-
tential benefit of this approach is discussed
with two applications: generation of feed-
back elicitation cues, and anticipatory ad-
aptation.
1 Introduction
Communicative feedback (mhm, okay, nodding,
and so on) is a dialogue coordination device used
by listeners to express their mental state of listen-
ing—e.g., I understand what you say (Allwood et
al., 1992)—and by speakers to hypothesise about
this mental state and adapt their language produc-
tion accordingly—e.g., she understood it, I can
provide new information (Clark and Krych, 2004).
One crucial question from the speaker’s perspective
is how listener feedback signals can be interpreted
in the dialogue context, and how they relate to what
has been or is being said. Listeners can, in principle,
produce feedback signals at any point of time in a
dialogue—without having to take the turn. There
is also no restriction on the number of feedback
signals that can be placed within a dialogue seg-
ment, whether it is a turn, an utterance, a pause or
a combination of these. Consider the dialogue in
example (1):
(1) KDS-1, U01 (9:46–9:58)1
1 S1: genau
2 allerdings ist Badminton da=
=wieder verschoben
3 [weiß nicht] ob das jetzt=
U1: [mhm ]
S1 =dauerhaft ist (.)
4 S1: [aber die zwei] Wochen=
U1: [okay ]
5 S1: =hab ich’s jetzt so drin
U1: ja
6 S1: das is wieder von=
7 =ehm acht bis zweiundzwanzig
U[hr]
U1: [ok]ay (0.34)
8 ja,
9 dann ehm geh ich da trotzdem=
=hin (.) ...
Speaker S1 explains to her interlocutor U1 that
the regular badminton training has (again) been
moved to a different time, and now takes place
from 8 to 10 p.m. She also says that she does not
know whether this change is permanent, but that it
is scheduled like this for the next two weeks. Dur-
ing S1’s nine seconds short turn (1.1) to (1.7), U1
provides four instances of communicative feedback.
Firstly, she signals understanding with mhm, simul-
taneously producing a single head nod and looking
at S1 (1.3). After that, she signals acceptance of the
speaker’s ignorance concerning the permanency of
the time changewith an okay that is accompanied by
1Excerpt from the calendar assistant domain corpus
KDS-1 (http://purl.org/scs/KDS-1). Overlapping talk
is marked with aligned square brackets. The transcription fol-
lows the GAT 2 system (Couper-Kuhlen et al., 2011).
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a head nod (1.4). Thirdly, she signals understanding,
producing a short and prosodically flat ja, German
for ‘yeah’, (1.5). And finally, with S1 gazing at her,
she signals understanding of the new time with an
okay and a head nod (1.7). After a pause, U1 then
takes the turn and continues.
In previous work (Buschmeier and Kopp, 2012),
we proposed a Bayesian network approach in which
single instances of communicative feedback are
interpreted in terms of a few general attributes (con-
tact, perception, understanding, acceptance, and
agreement; Allwood et al., 1992). However, when
multiple feedback instances occur in sequence, as in
the dialogue in example (1), the question arises how
their interpretations affect each other, and how they
relate to what has been and is being said. In keep-
ing with this ‘minimal mentalising’ approach to the
listener’s cognitive state, we take the Bayesian net-
work model and make it dynamic. The dynamics
is added by extending the model with a temporal
dimension that accounts for the incremental and
dynamic nature of dialogue. Thus, in this work, we
propose a ‘dynamic minimal model’ of mentalising
which can naturally deal with multiple instances of
feedback by updating its representation— taking
the immediate dialogue history into account as
well—when the dialogue proceeds and feedback
occurs.
2 Common ground and feedback
Participating in dialogue involves more than utter-
ance planning, formulation, speaking, listening and
understanding. One central task for interlocutors
is to track the ‘dialogue information state,’ a rich
representation of the dialogue context. The repres-
entation includes which information is grounded
and which is still pending to be grounded; which
knowledge is private and which is believed to be
shared; who said what, how and when; how these
utterances are related to each other; which objects
have been introduced and are accessible for ana-
phoric reference; what is the current question under
discussion; who is having the turn; and potentially
much more (Clark, 1996; Larsson and Traum, 2000;
Asher and Lascarides, 2003; Ginzburg, 2012).
In general, maintaining (i.e., representing and
constantly updating) an information state is thought
to be crucial for being able to successfully particip-
ate in dialogue. The necessity of some parts, such
as a representation of accessible referents, is agreed
upon among researchers. Without this information
being maintained, typical dialogues would simply
not be possible. Concerning the representation of
common ground, however, researchers do not agree
on how deep and rich it needs to be and how exactly
it is used in language production.
On the one hand, Clark (1996) argues that in-
terlocutors maintain a detailed model of common
ground, even to the extent that mutual knowledge
(approximated with various heuristics) is neces-
sary to explain certain phenomena in language use
(Clark and Marshall, 1981). Pickering and Garrod
(2004), on the other hand, believe that dialogue does
not involve heavy inference on common ground at
all, instead they claim that primed and activated
linguistic representations provide sufficient inform-
ation in themselves.
Use of common ground in language production
in dialogue is also a topic of ongoing debate. Clark
(1996) and Brennan and Clark (1996) argue that
common ground is critical in collaborative dis-
course. Utterances are designed in such a way that
common ground as well as shared knowledge are
taken into account. Since this might be cognitively
too demanding, Galati and Brennan (2010) pro-
pose a lightweight ‘one-bit’ partner model (e.g.,
whether the addressee has heard something before
or not) that can be used instead of information
about full common ground and shared knowledge
when producing an utterance. Horton and Keysar
(1996) go even further and present evidence that lan-
guage production is, at its basis, an egocentric pro-
cess— interlocutors do not take common ground
into account when initially planning an utterance
unless they identify a possible problem while mon-
itoring utterance execution. Finally, Pickering and
Garrod (2004) claim that the only factors guiding
language production are priming, activation, and,
if necessary, interactive repair.
Speakers infer groundedness and common
ground based upon ‘evidence of understanding’
of the interlocutors (Clark, 1996). One way for
listeners to show such evidence is by providing
communicative listener feedback as, e.g., short
verbal/vocal expressions such as mhm, okay, and
oh; head-gestures such as nods or shakes; facial
expressions such as surprise, or frowning; as well
as various gaze behaviours. Listener feedback is a
particularly interesting kind of evidence of under-
standing for multiple reasons:
1. When providing feedback, listeners do not
need to have or to take the turn, making it
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very fast. Since it is not constrained by turn-
taking, feedback can be given as soon as the
need arises, enabling speakers to quickly adapt
the ongoing utterance based on this informa-
tion.
2. At the same time, feedback is unobtrusive and
does not interrupt speakers during their ut-
terance. It happens in the ‘back channel’ of
communication (Yngve, 1970). Feedback also
relies heavily on non-verbal modalities (head,
face, gaze) that do not interfere with the speak-
ers’ linguistic processing. Verbal/vocal feed-
back expressions— that have the potential to
interfere—are often non-lexical (Ward, 2006),
usually short, and even prosodically hidden in
the speech context provided by the speaker
(Heldner et al., 2010).
3. Despite their shortness, feedback signals are
very expressive. They are rich in their form
(Ward, 2006)—enabling a fine-grained ex-
pression of subtle differences in meaning— ,
multi-functional, and interact heavily with
their dialogue context (Allwood et al., 1992).
Feedback is only partially conventionalised,
relying on iconic properties instead.
4. Finally, communicative feedback is reflective
of the listener’s cognitive state with respect to
language and dialogue processing. It indicates
(or is used to signal) whether listeners are in
contact with speakers, whether they are able
and willing to perceive or understand what
is being or has been said, whether they are
able and willing to accept the message and
what their attitude is towards it (Allwood et
al., 1992). Furthermore, depending on its pros-
odic realisation, its placement, or its timing,
feedback may also be indicative of the listen-
ers’ uncertainty about their own mental state,
their urgency for providing feedback, the im-
portance of this feedback item, and more such
qualifiers to its basic communicative functions
(Petukhova and Bunt, 2010).
Because of these properties, listener feedback is
a viable basis for estimating groundedness and com-
mon ground. Since the communicative functions of
listener feedback reflect the interlocutor’s internal
state, a somewhat detailed picture of the interlocutor
(and hence the dialogue) can be formed based on
it. Especially the latter two properties suggest that
Feedback Context
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Figure 1: The Bayesian network model of the ‘at-
tributed listener state’ (ALS; Buschmeier and Kopp,
2012). The random variables 퐶 , 푃 , 푈 , AC, and AG
model a speaker’s degree of belief that a listener is
in contact, whether he or she perceives, understands,
accepts, and agrees to what is communicated. A
speaker’s belief in groundedness is informed by all
five of these variables.
feedback facilitates a form of mentalising about the
cognitive state of the dialogue partner that goes
beyond what is usually considered groundedness.
In previous work (Buschmeier and Kopp, 2012),
we modelled this capability of speakers as, what
we called, an ‘attributed listener state’ (ALS, cf.
Figure 1). The ALS is a Bayesian network-based
representation of a speaker’s belief of what her
listener’s cognitive state is in terms of the basic
communicative functions underlying feedback in
dialogue. Each of the random variables (i.e., the
nodes of the network) represent one ‘dimension’ of
the multidimensional cognitive state of the listener:
퐶 (is the listener believed to be in contact), 푃 (is the
listener believed to perceive), 푈 (is the listener be-
lieved to understand), AC (is the listener believed to
accept), and AG (is the listener believed to agree).
The network captures the dependencies between
these variables and models their interactions, e.g.,
their hierarchical properties (Allwood et al., 1992;
Clark, 1996). A belief about the groundedness of
the conveyed proposition is formed based on the
five ALS-variables, each having a different strength
of influence.
The variables consist of the individual elements
low, medium, and high, denoting whether the
speaker believes the dimension of a listener’s cog-
nitive state to be low, medium, or high, respectively.
An individual element’s probability, e.g., 푃 (푈 =
low) = 0.6, is thus interpreted as the speaker’s de-
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gree of belief in this dimension of the listener’s
cognitive state to have the specific characteristic,
i.e., ‘with a probability of 0.6 the listener’s under-
standing is believed to be low’. The probability dis-
tribution over all elements of a variable represents
the speaker’s belief state over the variable.
Buschmeier and Kopp’s (2012) model can be
considered a minimal form of mentalising based on
listener feedback. It shares some desirable proper-
ties with the lightweight ‘one-bit’ partner model of
Galati and Brennan (2010)—efficient processing
in contrast to models of full common ground, a
simple variable-based representation—while ex-
tending it. In particular, the model is in accordance
with gradient representations of common ground
(Brown-Schmidt, 2012), as it defines grounded-
ness of a segment on an ordinal, non-binary scale
(low < medium < high). Due to its probabilistic
nature, each element is associated with a degree of
belief from 0 (not believed) to 1 (believed). This
information can be used to interactively adapt lan-
guage production to a listener’s need, e.g., by re-
peating/leaving out parts of an utterance, by giv-
ing subsequent parts a lower/higher information
density, or by making information pragmatically
explicit/implicit (Buschmeier et al., 2012).
3 A dynamic model of the listener
What is missing from the model proposed by
Buschmeier and Kopp (2012), however, is a no-
tion of the temporal dynamics that would make the
evolution of the ALS coherent and continuous, and
enable themodel to deal with sequences of feedback
such as in the example dialogue (1).
We regard an unfolding dialogue as a sequence
of segments [푠푡0 , 푠푡1 ,…푠푡푛], each consisting of adialogue move of the speaker (Poesio and Traum,
1997), together with any feedback responses of the
listener. The static model of Figure 1 (Buschmeier
and Kopp, 2012) treats each of these segments
푠푡푖 independently and thus only reasons about thelistener’s cognitive state during one single segment.
When doing the listener state attribution for the next
segment, information from the preceding segments
is not taken into account at all. To overcome this
limitation, i.e., to account for the evolution of the
listener’s cognitive state over time, we need to give
the model of the listener a temporal dimension.
As Bayesian networks are, in general, not lim-
ited in the number of edges and nodes, it would
be possible to capture a whole dialogue—or at
least a self contained and coherent part of a dia-
logue— in one large network that consists of con-
nected sub-networks ALS푡푖 —each correspondingto the network in Figure 1—one for each segment
푠푡푖 . The variables in the sub-networks would beuniquely named, and the networks evidence vari-
ables would be instantiated from the listener’s feed-
back behaviour as well as the dialogue context of
segment 푠푡푖 . Furthermore, the variables betweenthe sub-networks could be arbitrarily connected to
model any desirable interaction between feedback
and context across segments.
Theoretically, this approach could even work in
an incremental framework. With each new dialogue
segment 푠푖푡+1 , a new sub-network ALS푡푖+1 would beadded and connected to the network and Bayesian
network inference would be carried out. However,
even though there is, in principle, no limit in the size
of a Bayesian network, the computational costs are
rising polynomially with the number of nodes, and
may even become intractable if the nodes are unfa-
vourably connected (Barber, 2012). This makes this
‘growing network approach’ unsuitable for practical
applications.
A slightly more constrained approach is to make
a first-order Markov assumption, i.e., to assume
that variables 푋푡푖+1 of a sub-network ALS푡푖+1 areonly dependent on variables푋푡푖 of the sub-network
ALS푡푖 that directly precedes it. This can be achievedefficiently in the framework of dynamic Bayesian
networks. In contrast to a constantly growing net-
work approach, the dynamic Bayesian network ap-
proach consists of a maximum of two sub-networks
(‘time-slices’) at any point of time. In such a two
time-slice Bayesian network (cf. Figure 2), one time
slice ALS푡푖 represents the current dialogue segment
푠푡푖 the other time slice the next segment 푠푖+1. As inthe growing network approach, temporal influences
among dialogue units are modelled by connecting
some of the variables between the time-slices. Con-
nection further back are, however, not possible.
In such a network, evolution over time is done by
unrolling the network. Bayesian network inference
is carried out on time-slice ALS푡푖 and the resultingmarginal posterior probabilities of those variables
푋푡푖 that have a connection with variables 푋푡푖+1 inthe next time-slice are computed. These posteriors
are then used as ‘prior feedback’ (Robert, 1993),
i.e., they are interpreted as prior distributions of
those variables 푋푡푖 that are used as evidence vari-ables to variables푋푡푖+1 in the subsequent time slice.
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Figure 2: A dynamic two time-slice Bayesian network model unrolling over three steps in time, each
corresponding to one dialogue segment. Dashed arrows are disregarded during inference in subsequent
time-slices, i.e., variables from time slice ALS푡푖−1 and evidence variable in time slice ALS푡푖 have no influenceon variables in time slice ALS푡푖+1 . Posterior distributions of attributed listener state variables in time slice
ALS푡푖 are taken as prior distributions at time 푡푖+1 and influence the variables they are connected to in timeslice ALS푡푖+1 .
Due to the first order Markov assumption, previous
time slices ALS푡0 to ALS푡푖−1 are not taken into ac-count any more and all connections to them, as well
as to all variables 푋푡푖 that have no influence intothe future, and can be disregarded (dashed lines in
Figure 2). The complete history is thus implicitly
contained, in accumulated form, in time slice ALS푡푖 .In our model, the ALS variables 퐶 , 푃 , 푈 , AC,
AG, and the groundedness variableGR, are the ones
that carry over information between time slices
(Figure 2), e.g., understanding at time 푡푖 influences
understanding at time 푡푖+1 (consequently, variable
푈푡푖+1 is not only influenced by 푃푡푖+1 ,Feedback푡푖+1 ,and Context푡푖+1 , but additionally by 푈푡푖). This isbased on the assumption that listener state evolu-
tion—and attribution— is usually a gradual pro-
cess. Indeed, abrupt changes of listener state are
often marked by special feedback tokens such as
for example oh or, in German, ach and ach so.
Figure 3 simulates the dialogue from example (1)
in two contrasting conditions. Once without tem-
poral influences between dialogue segments 푠푡푖and 푠푡푖+1 , based on Buschmeier and Kopp’s (2012)static model (Figure 3a); and once with modelled
temporal dynamics based on the dynamic model
presented above (Figure 3b). Each graph shows how
speaker S1’s belief state of a specific variable— i.e.,
the probabilities for each of its elements—changes
over time (magenta coloured lines show 푃 (푋 =
low), yellow lines 푃 (푋 = medium) and cyan col-
oured lines 푃 (푋 = high) for 푋 ∈ {푃 ,푈,AC,GR}).
Nine time-steps are shown, each corresponding to
one dialogue segment.
In Figure 3a, each feedback event is treated in
isolation and independently from the dialogue his-
tory. This results in a belief state state that does
not change in the beginning, when no feedback is
provided by listener U1 (from 푡0 to 푡2). When U1
provides feedback (from 푡3 to 푡5 and at 푡7), S1’s be-
lief state changes abruptly, jumping between rather
distant degrees of belief, and returning to the idle
state for a brief period of time when no feedback is
present (at 푡6).
In contrast to this, the dynamic model in Fig-
ure 3b, leads to a gradually evolving attributed
listener state. In the beginning, when no feedback is
provided by U1 (from 푡0 to 푡2), the belief state shifts
towards low perception, understanding, acceptance,
and groundedness. This changes, cautiously, as
soon as feedback is provided at 푡3 and grows to-
wards medium to high with each subsequent feed-
back signal provided by U1 (at 푡4, 푡5,and 푡7). Not-
ably, at 푡6, the belief state does not jump to the initial
state, but degrades only slightly while U1 does not
provide feedback.
4 Discourse structure and belief state
evolution
A question that needs to be addressed is how
the attributed listener state in the dynamic model
should develop over time, i.e., to what extent
and how the belief state ALS푡푖 influences its suc-cessor state ALS푡푖+1 . For the example, in Figure 3b,the transitions were assumed to be fixed, that
is, the influence 푃 (푋푡푖+1|푋푡푖) of each of the vari-
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Figure 3: Simulated belief state evolution for example dialogue (1). The graphs show speaker S1’s graded
belief for the attributed listener state variables 푃 ,푈,AC, and GR given the feedback provided by listener
U1 (dashed vertical lines indicate the exact points in time when feedback occurred). Two conditions are
contrasted: (a) without temporal influences between dialogue segments, simulated with Buschmeier and
Kopp’s (2012) static model; and (b) with temporal influences between dialogue segments, simulated with
the two time-slice dynamic Bayesian network model (Figure 2).
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ables 푋푡푖 ∈ {퐶푡푖 ,… ,GR푡푖} on its successor 푋푡푖+1 ∈
{퐶푡푖+1 ,… ,GR푡푖+1} was fixed for each point in time
푡푖 ∈ [푡0,… , 푡8] (influences among variables varied,
i.e., 푃 (푋푡푖+1|푋푡푖) ≠ 푃 (푌푡푖+1|푌푡푖) for 푋 ≠ 푌 .This assumption is certainly simplified. As
Muller and Prévot (2003) argue, feedback is deeply
embedded in the discourse and its relation to the
discourse structure is one of its pivotal features.
As an example, consider a situation in which at
time 푡푖+1 either the topic changes, or the narration
simply continues. Intuitively, the influence of the
speaker’s attributed listener state ALS푡푖 on the at-tributed listener state ALS푡푖+1 is different in the twosituations.
Given a topic change, there is, e.g., little reason
to believe that understanding or acceptance as es-
timated in ALS푡푖 has much to contribute— i.e., isa good predictor— to understanding and accept-
ance in ALS푡푖+1 (arguably this also depends on therelatedness of the two topics). In contrast to this, un-
derstanding and acceptance as estimated in ALS푡푖seems to be very relevant for ALS푡푖+1 in the casewhere the narration simply continues.
The example indicates that the type of re-
lation between discourse segments—a rhetor-
ical or discourse relation (Asher and Lascarides,
2003)—plays a role in the development of attrib-
uted listener state over time. This is in line with
the proposal of Stone and Lascarides (2010), who
propose a similar influence of discourse relations
on grounding, also within an—albeit so far purely
theoretical—dynamic Bayesian network model.
As a first approach, we propose that the dynamic
model of the listener takes the discourse relation
between two consecutive discourse segments into
account by simply varying the strength of the in-
fluence that a variable 푋푡푖 has on a variable 푋푡푖+1in the next time-slice. This strength is defined in
terms of a weight 푤 that the temporal influence
has in relation to the influences of feedback, dia-
logue context, and other ALS-variables. A weight
of 푤 = 0.5, for example, results in the influence of
푋푡푖 on푋푡푖+1 being the the same as the influence thatall non-temporal variables have on 푋푡푖+1 . A weightof 0 ≤ 푤 < 0.5 results in temporal influence that
is smaller than the influences of the non temporal
variables and larger for a weight of 0.5 < 푤 ≤ 1.
Concrete weights for individual discourse relations
need to be determined empirically.
In practical terms, this approach involves (1) hav-
ing different dynamic Bayesian network models for
each of the discourse relation types, and (2) switch-
ing the networks—carrying over the variable as-
signments and distributions—when proceeding
form dialogue segment to dialogue segment.
5 Example applications
In addition to being able to better track the attrib-
uted listener state and groundedness, the dynamic
minimal model of the listener enables novel applic-
ations in artificial conversational agents that were
not possible with Buschmeier and Kopp’s (2012)
static model. Two of these will be sketched in the
following.
5.1 Eliciting listener feedback
Listeners do not only produce communicative feed-
back when they feel the need to inform speakers
about their cognitive state of dialogue processing,
e.g., if they want to give evidence of understand-
ing or if they do not understand what is said. Often
feedback is provided cooperatively in response to
‘feedback elicitation cues’ of a speaker (Ward and
Tsukahara, 2000; Gravano and Hirschberg, 2011).
Speakers produce these cues since they have an
active interest in how their ongoing utterance is
perceived, understood, etc., by their interlocutors,
and because it helps them in language production
and story telling (Bavelas et al., 2000). This is espe-
cially the case in situations where they are uncertain
about the listener’s cognitive state, even to the ex-
tent that they cannot make well-grounded choices
in language production. In cases of such an ‘in-
formation need’ (Buschmeier and Kopp, 2014b),
elicitation of feedback from the listener is a viable
strategy to ensure and achieve an effective dialogue.
We propose that the following three criteria— in
terms of our model—are indicative of a speaker’s
information needs (Buschmeier and Kopp, 2014b):
1. The entropy of a variable of interest rises (i.e.,
the probability distribution across the elements
of a variables become more uniform, e.g.,
when 푃 (푈 = low) = 0.33,푃 (푈 = medium) =
0.33,푃 (푈 = high) = 0.33) so that the belief
state becomes less and less informative.
2. A variable of interest remains static for an ex-
tended period of time (e.g., when the listener
does not provide feedback).
3. The distance (measured with the Kullback-
Leibler divergence) between the probability
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distributions of the current state of a variable
and a desirable ‘reference state’— such as, for
example, a state that represents very good un-
derstanding—grows beyond a certain accept-
able value.
These criteria could in principle be used with the
static model of attributed listener state. However,
the continuous temporal progression of the belief
state makes it possible to identify reliable trends
which enable informational needs to be detected
early on and with high precision.
5.2 Anticipatory adaptation
A second ability that also builds on the mechan-
ism of identifying trends in the development of the
attributed listener state is to adapt language produc-
tion to anticipate needs of the listener, a mechanism
that human speakers use all the time. For this, an
artificial agent could simulate the most likely evolu-
tion of the dynamic ALS and use this projected next
listener state in order to make adaptations in natural
language generation that serve as a pre-emptive
countermeasure against an expected undesirable
cognitive state of the user.
As an example, consider a situation where the
agent believes that with every discourse segment
the user understood less and less. A simulation
that is run for the upcoming segment results in a
belief state which shows that this trend is likely
to continue. Expecting this state in the dynamic
model, now allows the agent to change its original
plan—say, to present an additional detail—and
instead repeat what has already been said in a dif-
ferent way thus giving the subject matter a different
perspective which might help the user understand.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a dynamic Bayesian
network-based model for minimal mentalising that
tracks the interlocutors’ cognitive state with respect
to their willingness and ability to perceive, under-
stand, accept, and agree by means of their commu-
nicative feedback behaviour. We argued that feed-
back is a particularly suitable way for listeners to
provide evidence of understanding at almost any
point in the dialogue, and for speakers to reason
about the the listener’s cognitive state, as well as to
make statements about groundedness. The model
can serve as a middle ground between theories
that assume representations of full common ground
(Clark, 1996) and theories that assume no common
ground at all (Pickering and Garrod, 2004).
We extended a previous model of attributed
listener state (Buschmeier and Kopp, 2012) with
a temporal dimension, showed how the attributed
listener state develops while a dialogue unfolds, and
illustrated how its progression can be influenced by
the structure of the discourse. Finally, we briefly
described two relevant and novel applications of the
presented model for artificial conversational agents
that rely specifically on the model’s temporal dy-
namics and its ability to continuously track the de-
velopment of the attributed listener state in order to
identify trends and project its future development.
Future work will involve an investigation of direc-
tionality of the influence of the discourse relations
in the dynamic model. A result might be that the
flow of information will be reversed given certain
discourse relations so that recent evidence of under-
standing can influences variables in the previous
time-slice. We will also implement the mechanisms
for feedback cue elicitation and anticipatory adapt-
ation sketched out as applications in an artificial
conversational agent and evaluate them in interac-
tion with human users.
A Supplementary material
A data publication containing the model paramet-
ers supplements this paper (Buschmeier and Kopp,
2014a). Additionally, the dynamic Bayesian net-
work implementation is publicly available under the
GPL 3 license at http://purl.org/scs/PRIMO.
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